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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a wide consensus among economists that the distribution of
income in the United States recently has become more unequal. Most
observers believe that this trend was well under way by 1980; many trace
its origin to as early as 1970. There is less consensus about the causes of
the growth in inequality. Among the competing hypotheses are a shift in
demand toward high-skilled labor and away from unskilled labor, an
increase in the relative supply of low-skilled workers, and a shift in
output toward sectors where individuals' productivities are more vari-
able and more easily identified.
There is virtually no consensus about the role of the tax system in the
growth in inequality, and swirling controversy about the appropriate tax
policy response to this trend. For example, Gramlich, Kasten, and
Prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Tax Policy and the
Economy, to be held November 19 in Washington, D.C. I am grateful to Marianne Page
and Alec Rodney for exemplary research assistance, and to Shiomo Yitzhaki for providing
key computer programs used in the analysis. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were
provided by Don Fullerton, Roger Gordon, Ned Gramlich, Rick Kasten, Donald Kiefer, Jim
Poterba, Frank Sammartino, Bob Williams, and Shlomo Yitzhaki.106Slemrod
Sammartino (1991) have claimed that, in the 1980s, the tax system be-
came slightly less effective in reducing the inequality in pre-tax incomes.
Lindsey (1990) has argued that the precipitous drop at the start of the
1980s in the marginal tax rate imposed on higher income individuals was
a principal cause of the increased apparent inequality of pre-tax in-
comes, because it has encouraged these individuals to work more, report
more income, realize more capital gains, and convert nontaxed compen-
sation to taxable compensation. Finally, many of the tax policy changes
currently being advocated, in particular the child credit financed by
higher tax rates on higher-income taxpayers, are justified in part as an
attempt to offset the increase in income inequality.
Nearly all of the conclusions about the trend in inequality and the role
of the tax system have been based on cross-sectional snapshots of an-
nual income. Yet it is well known that conclusions based on snapshots
can give a misleading picture of the inequality of a more permanent
notion of income, due to the mobility of individuals across annual in-
come classes. Specifically, transitory income will give the appearance of
greater inequality in a one-year snapshot than over a longer period. If
the relative importance of transitory income has changed over time, then
the trends in the inequality of annual income may misstate the trends in
a more permanent notion of income. Furthermore, most of the conclu-
sions about inequality have been based on either labor earnings or the
Current Population Survey (CPS) definition of money income, which
excludes capital gains, poorly measures other capital income, and is
subject to coded maximum values.
In this paper I make use of tax return data that has extensive informa-
tion on property income, and in particular two longitudinal tax return
data bases that follow an unchanging sample of taxpayers from 1979 to
1986, and a distinct set of taxpayers from 1967 to 1973, in order to
reassess some of the conclusions about taxation and inequality. The
paper is arranged as follows. Section II provides a brief review of what is
known, based on snapshots, of inequality over the past two decades.
Section III utilizes tax return data to investigate some of these same
issues, with an emphasis on decomposing the trends by source of in-
come. In Section IV I bring to bear the 1979-1986 longitudinal data file of
tax returns, and reassess some of the earlier results; Section V compares
these results to the 1967-1973 panel. Section VI summarizes the findings
and restates the caveats to be applied to these findings.Taxation and Inequality107
II. INEQUALITY AND TAXES:
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Trends in Inequality
There is a broad consensus that income inequality has been increasing hi
the last two decades. There is evidence of increased dispersion since the
mid-1970s in both the lower and upper tails of the distribution for fami-
lies and for individuals, and in the distribution of labor income for work-
ers. At least since 1979, inequality has grown both between less and
more educated workers and also among apparently similar workers. As
Karoly (1991) has documented, this conclusion is robust to a great vari-
ety of disaggregations, including by families with children and race-
ethnicity. The increase in inequality among workers cannot simply be
explained by shifts in the gender, education or experience composition
of the work force, and is evident even when the sample is restricted to
full-time workers.
Several alternative explanations have been offered to the increased
inequality. Most attention has been paid to labor market factors,as labor
market income accounts for about 70 percent of family income. Among
the supply explanations offered are shifts in the size of worker-age co-
horts and the educational distribution of these cohorts. Among the de-
mand explanations offered are shifts in the composition of final output,
in the occupational mix within industries, in skill requirements, and in
the density of unionization. The strength of the evidence supporting
these not mutually exclusive explanations is assessed in Levy and
Murnane (1991).
Taxes as an Offset to Growing Inequality
Although the CPS measure of income is before taxation, it is clear that
after-tax income is a superior measure of well-being. With that in mind, it
is interesting to know to what extent the tax system has offset, or exacer-
bated, the increased inequality in pre-tax income. Using CPS data supple-
mented by data from tax returns, Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino
(1991) conclude that during the 1980s tax and transfer policy changes
became less effective in reducing pre-tax income inequality. As a result,
after-tax income inequality increased by even more than pre-tax income
inequality. Of a 16.5 percent increase in the Gini coefficient of post-tax,
post-transfer income between 1980 and 1990, they attribute 40 percent to
the decline in the redistributive effectiveness of the federal tax and trans-
fer system, with the 40 percent about equally divided between taxes and
transfers. Some of the change in the distribution of transfers and taxes108Slemrod
was, however, the result of economic and demographic changesrather
than explicit changes in policy. When they hold the distribution of pre-
tax, pre-transfer income at its 1990 level but adjust transfers and taxes to
reflect 1980 law, only 16 percent of the increase in the inequality of post-
tax, post-transfer income was due to policy changes. Most of these policy
changes involved a decrease in the progressivity of federal taxes, due to
the increased importance of the regressive social security taxes; also sig-
nificant was a fall in the share of transfers going to low-income people.
Taxes as an Inducement to Growing Inequality
The previous calculation ignores the possibility that the tax system in-
duces changes in pre-tax income. Lindsey (1990) has argued that in the
early 1980s the sharply reduced marginal tax rates at the top (which fell in
1981 from 70 percent to 50 percent, in 1987 to 39 percent, and in 1988 to 28
percent) induced high-income taxpayers to work more hours, report a
higher share of their income to the Internal Revenue Service, realize more
capital gains, take more compensation in taxable form, and generally
substitute taxable income for either nontaxed income or leisure.
This argument implies that much of the apparent increase in the dis-
persion of income in the 1980s is illusory. The high incomes were there,
prior to 1981, but they were in forms that would either not appear in the
standard data sets on income, not be realized income sources, or were
potential income consumed in the form of leisure. This important and
controversial claim is not addressed directly in the analysis that follows,
although the data sources described next can help to assess its validity.
Public Finance Implications of Inequality
An accurate picture of the distribution of income and its sources is criti-
cal for at least two important questions in public finance: How is the
burden of any given tax system shared by individuals, and how should
the tax burden be shared across income classes?
There are two steps to understanding how the burden of taxation is
borne. In the first step, known to economists as the question of tax
incidence, knowledge of the price sensitivity of supply and demand is
used to predict the extent to which a tax will be borne by the statutory
bearer of the burdenthe "check writer"and the extent to which the
burden will be shifted to others through changes in prices. In the second
step the conclusions about how prices will be affected is translated into
how families' well being is changed. This step requires information
about the distribution of wealth, potential labor income, and tastes. For
example, once a judgment is made about how a cigarette tax will change
the price of cigarettes and the value of tobacco land, one needs to knowthe distribution of demand for cigarettes, unskilled labor, and owner-
ship of tobacco land.
The distribution of income-earning ability is also a critical input into
the modern theory of optimal tax progressivity, which poses the prob-
lem as a tradeoff between the social benefit of a more equal distribution
of well-being and the disincentive cost of the tax and transfer system
needed to effect a more equal distribution. In the standard models of this
literature, described in Slemrod (1983), a more unequal distribution of
inherent abilitiesor the return to these abilitiesincreases the optimal
degree of progressivity because it increases the social value of the redis-
tribution accomplished for any given degree of tax progressivity. An-
other strand of the literature, exemplified by Varian (1980), stresses the
social insurance function of progressive taxation. In this framework, an
increase in exogenous variability of income would also increase the opti-
mal degree of progressivity, because it increases the insurance value of
the progressivity.
III. SNAPSHOT DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Why Snapshots May Mislead
Many of the conclusions about the distribution of these factors are based
on snapshots of the distribution taken at a point of time. It is critical to
realize, however, that snapshots of distributions can give a highly mis-
leading picture of the distribution of a more permanent notion of income
or well-being. As an illustration, consider an economy of individuals
who are identical except for their age, where each individual follows the
same life-cycle pattern of increasing labor income over the working
years, followed by a period of retirement with no labor income. A snap-
shot of the distribution of labor income would conclude that to the extent
a tax lowers after-tax wage income, it will have a highly skewed burden
distribution, severely affecting some individuals (the working young)
and leaving others unscathed (the retired elderly). But, of course, from a
lifetime perspective (except for transitional effects) everyone is equally
affected, as everyone will at some time be at the high labor income age
and also the retirement age. In addition to life-cycle effects, a measure of
inequality based on a snapshot will capture intercohort effects due to
real income growth over time.
This paper focuses on a separate reason why a snapshot may give a
misleading picture of the distribution of income sourcestransitory in-
come. An example will best convey the problem. Imagine an economy
where individuals have but two sources of income. One source, which I
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will call labor income, is equally distributed across individuals and stable
over time. The other source, which I will call capital gains,also is equally
distributed but is also highly unstable over time; every so often an exoge-
nous process conveys capital gains income to someindividuals. A snap-
shot of any year's distribution of income sources will reveal two "facts":
(1) that the distribution of total income is more unequal than that of labor
income alone and (2) that capital gains are a more important source of
income for high-income individuals These facts will appear even though,
over the long run, capital gains income is distributed no differently than
labor income and all individuals have equal income.
There is one more twist to this story. In the above illustration it was
assumed that the time pattern of capital gains income was exogenously
determined. In reality the timing of the realization of income for tax
purposes may be subject to a great deal of control by theindividual. In
particular, because of the graduated nature of the income tax system,
there is an incentive for individuals to use their discretion over the
timing of some income to smooth taxable income over time. Not only
capital gains realizations, but to some extent the taxable income from
business, can be subject to this kind of "self-averaging." Other transitory
components of income, such as those due to unemployment or income
windfalls, are essentially exogenous to the taxpayer.
The goal of this research program is to separate out the effect of
transitory income on measured inequality, so as to get a better measure
of the nature of, and trends in, a more permanent notion of inequality.
B. Measuring Inequality Using Tax Return Data
Most analysis of trends in U.S. inequality have relied on the data in the
Current Population Surveys (CPS), conducted by the Census Bureau in
March of most years. The analysis that follows is based on the data from
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income Division's public-
use files of tax return information. This shift in data sourceshas its
advantages and disadvantages, which I detail below.
An important advantage of the CPS is that it is designed to be a
sample of the entire population and is therefore not restricted, for exam-
ple, to tax filers. It also collects a wide variety of demographic informa-
tion, including details about family structure and earnings disaggregated
by family member. One disadvantage of the CPS is its poor coverage of
capital income. Realized capital gains are not included at all, and other
components of realized capital income are apparently severely under-
reported. In addition, all components of income, as well as total family
income, are top-coded, so that there is no information on the upper tailTaxation and Inequality111
of the distribution of income or its components. Clearly both of these
problems are especially important in the analysis of the high-income
population.
The strengths and weaknesses of the tax model data mirror those of the
CPS. It covers only households that file tax returns, so it systematically
excludes households whose low income makes them exempt from filing
and who do not file a return in order to receive a refundable credit. It also
excludes those who illegally fail to file a return. There is very little demo-
graphic information. On the plus side, the tax model data has very rich
information on taxable sources of capital income, and is not top-coded.
C. Trends in Snapshot Inequality
Table 1 presents some summary information about the changes in the
distribution of after-tax income, and its components, over the last two
decades. The income concept used here, called expanded income, be-
gins with adjusted gross income and then adds to it excluded long-term
capital gains, excluded dividends and all adjustments. When an after-tax
concept is used, tax liability net of credits is subtracted from expanded
income. These changes are designed to make the income concept more
comparable across years.
Expanded income is by no means an ideal measure of annual in-
come. Among the problems are the failure to correct capital income for
inflation, the exclusion of the rental value of owner-occupied homes
and other consumer durables, the failure to subtract real interest pay-
ments, and the inclusion of capital gains on a realization, rather than
an accrual, basis. Nevertheless, because many studies of tax return data
use income concepts with these characteristics, it is important to under-
stand the nature of inequality measures that are based on this type of
information.
In Table 1 I make use of the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequal-
ity. The numbers in the first row document a striking increase in the
inequality of after-tax expanded income between 1972 and 1988; the Gini
coefficient rises from 0.445 to 0.544 over this period. For pre-tax income
the increase is from .468 in 1972 to .496 in 1980 and .567 in 1988. This is
broadly consistent with the Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino (1991)
result that the Gini of pre-tax, pre-transfer income rose from 0.473 in
1lam grateful to Shiomo Yitzhaki for providing the computer programs for calculating the
Gini coeffident and decomposition discussed here. The figures of Table 1 are based on
random subsamples of approximately 15,000 per year of the Individual Tax Model Files, a
stratified random sample of about 100,000 tax returns made publicly available by the
Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service.112Slemrod
TABLE 1.
Gini Coefficients and Decomposition of After-Tax Expanded Income and
its Components and Pre-Tax Expanded Income, 1972 -1 988.
1980 to 0.513 in 1985 and an estimated 0.523 in 1990. Table 1 also pres-
ents the Gini coefficient and shares of each of several components of
after-tax income.2 It also lists, under the columns headed "rho," the Gini
correlation between the component and after-tax income.3 As discussed
in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), the Gini coefficient of income can be
decomposed so that it is equal to the sum, over all components, of the
product of the component's own Cmi, its share in income, and the Gini
correlation.
Because wages and salaries represent about 90 percent of after-tax
income (and about 80 percent of pre-tax income), it is reasonable to look
there for the origin of the change in inequality, and this strategy is
rewarded. The second row of Table 1 reveals that between 1972 and 1988
the Cmi coefficient of wages and salaries increased from 0.489 to 0.578.
Clearly a large part of the trend in overall inequality is associated with
the increased inequality of wages and salaries.
2The astute reader will notice the prevalence of Gini coefficients for income components
that are in excess of one. This is due to the presence of negative values for these compo-
nents, which means that the Lorenz curve lies partly below the x-axis.
The Gini correlation of component k is the ratio of the covariance of k with the observa-
tion's rank in the income distribution and the covariance of k with the rank in the distribu-
tion of k. It ranges between -1 and +1, taking on a value of +1 if the ranking by income
and the ranking by k are identical.
1972 1976




Wages and salaries 0.489 0.927 0.856 0.515 0.948 0.856
Capital gains 1.052 0.055 0.760 1.066 0.042 0.733
Interest 0.884 0.041 0.438 0.883 0.051 0.457
Dividends 0.981 0.026 0.712 0.982 0.024 0.734
ScheduleC 1.188 0.053 0.562 1.286 0.047 0.542
Schedule E 1.713 0.029 0.509 2.144 0.024 0.422
Schedule F 2.465 0.006 0.320 6.664 0.003 0.326
Pension 0.976 0.016 0.279 0.962 0.030 0.303
Other income +2.716-0.007 +0.006-1.937-0.014 0.029
Tax +0.654-0.146 +0.957 +0.682-0.155 +0.960
Expanded income
before tax
0.468 0.485Taxation and Inequality113
Source: Random subsamples (of approximately 15,000 per year) of Individual Income Tax Model files.
Note: Gini coefficients of sources of income with a share close to zero are unreliable indicators of the
skewness of the distribution.
For all the years, subtracting tax liability reduces the dispersion of
income as measured by the Gini, although the change is fairly small. In
1972 the reduction is 0.023. It peaks in 1980 at 0.029, when the ratio of tax
liability to after-tax expanded income also reaches its peak of 0.179. It
declines in 1984 back to 0.022 and then turns slightly up in 1988 to 0.023.
Thus the federal income tax liability has done little, if anything, to offset
the increasing dispersion of pre-tax incomes; in the 1980s it has slightly
exacerbated the trend toward increased inequality of after-tax incomes,
holding pre-tax incomes unchanged.
Comparing the Cmi coefficient of pre-tax and post-tax incomes an-
swers the question of what a total elimination of federal income taxes
would do to inequality. Another meaningful question is how a marginal
proportional change in taxes would affect overall income inequality.
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) show that a 1 percent change in component
k changes the overall Gini by sk(pkGk - G)I100, where 5k' Pk and Gk are
the share, Gini correlation, and own Cmi of component k, respectively,
and G is the overall Gini. Performing this calculation reveals that a
proportional 10 percent increase in taxes would have reduced the overall
Cmi in 1972 by 0.00264, or 0.59 percent of its actual value. By 1988, the
1980 1984 1988
Gini Share Rho Gini Share Rho Gini Share Rho
0.467 0.502 0.544
0.526 0.937 0.854 0.554 0.909 0.853 0.578 0.882 0.867
1.088 0.053 0.781 1.061 0.070 0.780 1.086 0.062 0.781
0.886 0.074 0.489 0.869 0.091 0.457 0.888 0.069 0.487
0.975 0.030 0.773 0.963 0.026 0.686 0.967 0.029 0.666
1.408 0.040 0.490 1.446 0.039 0.433 1.271 0.046 0.494
4.581 0.053 0.270653.00 0.000 0.210 3.582 0.020 0.497
-8.925-0.002 0.315-1.844-0.007 0.167-37.74 0.000 0.182
0.955 0.034 0.255 0.945 0.041 0.348 0.932 0.067 0.490
289.38 0.000 0.385-3.805-0.012 0.226-3.578-0.011 0.520
+0.682-0.179+0.957+0.687-0.159+0.956+0.731-0.164+0.962
0.496 0.524 0.567114Slemrod
same experiment would have reduced the overall Gini by 0.00262, or
0.48 percent of its actual value.4
IV. TIME-EXPOSURE INCOME
D. The Importance of Transitory Income
The presence of transitory income, and the mobility of taxpayers across
income classes, means that inequality of income in any given snapshot
can exceed that of a more permanent notion of income, and that conclu-
sions on the contribution of any source of income to inequality based on
snapshots can be misleading. In this section I present some evidence on
the importance of these issues for the period 1979 to 1986.
The source of this information is a panel of individual tax returns.
Beginning in 1979, the IRS Statistics of Income Division has been collect-
ing information from the tax returns of a randomly selected group of
taxpayers. This panel, known as the Continuous Work History File, was
developed for internal use, but the IRS has made this longitudinal data
set available to academic researchers through a special arrangement with
the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan, in con-
junction with the Ernst & Young Tax Research Database. The panel now
spans 1979 to 1986, with 1987 and 1988 expected soon. The panel is a
nonstratified random sample chosen on the basis of the last four digits of
the primary taxpayer's social security number (SSN). Of those numbers
chosen, anyone filing a return is included in the sample. The first three
years of the panel each contain in excess of 45,000 returns, though the
last three years of the panel show a substantial drop in the number of
observations (approximately 9,000 in 1982, 1984, and 1986, 19,000 in 1983
and 1985) due to budgetary limitations at the IRS. Pooling all observa-
tions in the panel gives a sample size of 177,177. Due largely to the small
number of observations in 1982, 1984, and 1986, the number of individu-
Note that this procedure implies that a 100 percent reduction in taxes (i.e., complete
elimination) would increase the Gini in 1988 by 0.0262, whereas the actual difference
between the pre-tax and after-tax Cmi is only 0.023. The discrepancy is due to the fact that
the calculation in the text is precise only at the margin. Any nonincremental change in
taxes would require a reranking of taxpayers by after-tax income, which would increase the
Gini. For this reason the marginal calculation applied to the complete elimination of taxes
overstates the actual difference between pre- and after-tax Gini coefficients.
The sample is drawn on the basis of the last four digits of the social security number of
the primary (first listed on the tax return) taxpayer. In 1979 through 1981 the sample
includes all returns filed in a calendar year with any of five four-digit endings. In 1982 only
those returns with one of the five endings were drawn; in 1983 returns with two of the
endings were chosen. The alternating one-ending, two-ending cycle was continued
through 1986.Taxation and Inequality115
als present in all eight years of the panel is limited to 5,780 taxpayers.
The information contained in each observation is a subset of the informa-
tion on the standard forms filed by the taxpayer, and varies slightly from
year to year.
Attrition from the panel may occur for a number of reasons unrelated to
deliberate change in the sample size, including death, a change in marital
status, income below the minimum that would trigger filing, or simply the
choice of which spouse (between two married, joint filers) is listed first on
the tax form (and thus becomes the "primary" taxpayer whose SSN is the
basis of selection). A taxpayer who files sufficiently late (in the calendar
year after the return is due) will also escape inclusion.
It is not unreasonable to suspect that a panel of this sort may exhibit
some drift relative to the population as a whole. Although each year's
taxpayers in the panel may be representative of the population as a
whole, the sampling method may cause a "survivorship" bias or "attri-
tion" among those observations present in more than one year of the
panel. Christian and Frischmann (1989) analyzed the first six years of the
panel for attrition bias and concluded that the sample of taxpayers pres-
ent in all those years shows statistically significant differences from popu-
lation averages. Average income is about 20 percent higher and married
couples (specifically, joint filers) are more numerous. Also, compared to
a random sample, the fraction of returns for which the primary taxpayer
claims an aged exemption (for being sixty-five or older) is lower in the
initial year of the panel, rises more rapidly, and is higher in the final year
of the panel.
Compared to the tax model files used in Section 3, the critical advan-
tage of the panel data is its longitudinal nature, which allows the re-
searcher the opportunity to identify transitory effects on income. Its
principal disadvantage, other than the attrition bias, is the purely ran-
dom nature of the sample, compared to the stratified random character
of the tax model that heavily over-samples upper-income taxpayers.
Table 2 documents that there is a significant amount of mobility in and
out of the upper-income classes from year to year, at least for this particu-
lar definition of income. In a typical year in the first half of the 1980s,
more than 20 percent of taxpayers in the top decile of expanded income
had not been in the top dedile the previous year. For the top one percen-
tile, the figure rises to 33 percent for 1982 through 1985. Mobility into
(and out of) the top classes was extraordinary in 1986, presumably due
to the large spurt in capital gains realizations that occurred in anticipa-
tion of tax increases due in 1987.
The presence of transitory income means that, in general, those with
low income in a snapshot are probably not really as badly off as one116Slemrod
TABLE 2.
Percentage of Those in Top Percentiles of Pre-Tax Expanded Income
Who Were Not in That Group in the Previous Year, 1 980-1986.
Source: 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
year's income suggests and those with high income are probably not as
well off as the snapshot suggests. In order to investigate the aggregate
magnitude of these effects, I calculate for each taxpayer the average real
income over the seven-year period from 1979 to 1985. Although available
in the data set, 1986 is excluded from the calculations because of the
extraordinary amount of capital gains realizations in that year. I refer to
this concept as "time-exposure" income, to contrast it to "snapshot"
income.
I purposely distinguish this concept from "permanent" or "lifetime"
income. There is a separate literature (e.g., Fitzgerald and Maloney,
1990; Fullerton and Rogers, 1991), which attempts to calculate the in-
equality of permanent or lifetime income by purging from annual in-
come not only the effect of transitory income but also the life-cycle and
intercohort effect. The calculation procedure generally entails first esti-
mating an equation that predicts annual income as a function of vari-
ables such as age, education, race, and, if longitudinal data is available,
an individual-specific fixed effect, and then calculating the discounted
value of projected annual incomes over the expected working life. Using
data from 1969 to 1981 from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics,
Fitzgerald and Maloney (1990) calculated that, not correcting for in-
tercohort effects, the Gini coefficient for lifetime income was only 1.4
percent lower than that of 1979 income; when intercohort effects were
eliminated, the Cmi of lifetime income was 19.1 percent lower than that
of 1979 income. They also found that the degree to which taxes and
transfers reduce inequality is understated by a snapshot, suggesting that
the fiscal system does more than smooth household income over the life
cycle.
Table 3 illustrates the magnitude of the difference between snapshot
and time-exposure income by arraying the latter by the former. There is
clear evidence of reversion toward the mean. In 1983 snapshot income
classes below $20,000, time-exposure income is greater than 1983 in-
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
10% 22 24 21 22 20 23 27
5% 26 28 26 26 24 27 31
1% 28 30 33 33 33 33 40Taxation and Inequality117
TABLE 3.
Time Exposure Pre-Tax Expanded Income, 1979-1985, by 1983 Pre-Tax
Expanded Income Class.
Source: 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
come. In 1983 classes above $50,000, time-exposure income is clearly less
than 1983 income. Between $20,000 and $50,000, 1983 snapshot income
on average is close to time-exposure income.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Table 3 is the starkly different
pictures one gets of the lowest income class. The average time-exposure
income of those who, in 1983, had negative expanded AGI, was $34,961.
It has long been understood that those with negative income for tax
purposes in a given year are often not truly poor, but this table shows
just how important that phenomenon is. Not only are these people not
poor, but on average they are solidly middle class.
B. Income Inequality
There have been several studies of the effect of extending the accounting
period on measured inequality (e.g. Shorrocks, 1978a; and Benus and
Morgan, 1975). The general conclusion, based on comparisons of annual
measures of inequality to inequality measured over two or more years,
has been that a longer accounting period reduces inequality very little.
That conclusion must, though, be tempered by the tendency for relative
inequality to increase as cohorts of individuals get older.
Table 4 compares the distribution of pre-tax expanded income and
some of its components (ordered by income, not the component itself)
when computed from snapshots and a time exposure; all columns sum
to 100. For the columns headed SA, the figures shown are the simple



















Distribution of Snapshot Average Time-Exposure Pre-Tax Expanded
Income, 1979-1985, and Some Components, by Expanded Income
Percentiles.
Source: 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
year's expanded income. Thus, for example, the 0.96 in the first row of
the first column means that, averaged over 1979 to 1985, 0.96 percent of
total snapshot expanded income for that year is received by the lowest
10 percent of expanded income earners in that year. For the columns
headed TE, the taxpayers are arranged by time-exposure income, so that
1.83 percent of time-exposure income is received by the lowest 10 per-
















0-10 0.96 1.83 1.54 2.093.123.270.22 2.90
10-20 3.21 3.72 2.93 3.575.18 4.34 3.56 3.91
20-30 4.564.874.45 5.01 5.61 5.21 4.19 4.46
30-40 5.84 6.07 5.81 6.01 6.33 6.345.85 7.52
40-50 7.25 7.42 7.28 7.52 7.02 6.68 8.07 7.62
50-60 8.91 8.949.54 9.47 6.00 5.54 9.60 9.45
60-70 10.7110.6211.8611.71 5.98 5.78 7.69 7.82
70-80 12.8112.5713.9713.54 8.20 8.57 8.99 9.70
80-90 15.8015.4717.1216.3111.7410.9712.3314.66
90-95 10.029.8010.4210.18 8.88 9.6611.22 5.72
95-99 11.5511.0610.12 9.5815.6618.0123.8623.71







0-10 1.88 2.16 0.28 0.72
10-20 0.67 1.04 1.16 1.79
20-30 0.68 1.322.37 2.89
30-40 1.15 1.493.64 3.99
40-50 2.09 2.135.10 5.40
50-60 1.81 2.31 6.99 7.22





99-100 51.8443.6716.2915.23Taxation and Inequality119
Table 4 reveals that, although the distribution based on time-exposure
income is less skewed than the average distribution based on snapshots,
the difference is not striking. First consider the fraction of income earned
by the top percentiles as an indicator of income distribution skewness. In
the snapshot average, the top 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent of
income earners receive 8.39 percent, 19.94 percent, and 29.96 percent of
income. For 1979-1985 time-exposure income, these classes receive 7.64
percent, 18.70 percent, and 28.50 percent of income, respectively. An-
other notable difference is the greater shares of income going to the lower
income classes in time-exposure income (5.55 percent versus 4.17 percent
for the bottom two deciles), reflecting the fact that a significant fraction of
low incomes in a snapshot reflect transitory negative components.
One other fact worth noting now, and worth returning to in Section V.
is the large difference in measured inequality for a snapshot of a random
sample of taxpayers and a snapshot of only those taxpayers who appear
in all years of the panel. For example, in 1984, the Gini of before-tax
income for the former is 0.524 compared to 0.422 for those who appear in
all years of the panel. The large decline is due to the fact that it is
predominantly low-income taxpayers who do not appear in all years,
and thus are dropped from the "balanced" panel of returns that includes
only those who filed a timely return in each year from 1979 to 1986. This
results in a lower measure of inequality. Thus it is important to distin-
guish not only between a snapshot and a time-exposure picture of the
income distribution, but also between snapshots of all returns filed in a
year and a snapshot of all returns filed in a year by people who file in
eight consecutive years.
C. Time-Exposure vs. Snapshot Sources of Income
It is also instructive to compare the snapshot and time-exposure distribu-
tions of sources of income. First focus on the top 1 percent of income
earners in Table 4. The average of the snapshot distribution from the
balanced panel reveals that 51.84 percent of all capital gains are received
by this group; by time-exposure income this figure falls to 43.67 percent.
Thus a snapshot overstates the extent to which capital gains are received
by high-income individuals. Nevertheless, by either measure this is
largely a phenomenon of the upper-income classes.6
For interest and dividends, the story is quite different. Focusing on the
top 5 percent of income earners, there is a greater concentration among
6This is consistent with other evidence that shows that most capital gains are realized by
individuals who regularly have realizations. See Slemrod, Kalambokidis, and Shobe
(1989).120Slemrod
the highest-income classes using time-exposure compared to snapshot
distributions-33.62 percent versus 31.96 percent. The story here is that
high interest and dividends really do characterize the permanently well-
off taxpayers, and a snapshot obscures the picture by replacing some of
these taxpayers with others who have temporarily high income. For the
top 1 percent of income, the time-exposure concentration is slightly
lower than the snapshot average concentration, but the difference is
much less marked than for capital gains, 15.61 percent compared to
16.31 percent.
Table 5 shows, by percentile class, some sources of expanded income
for an average of 1979 to 1985 snapshots and time-exposure income,
respectively. Thus in this table the rows of SA figures and TE figures
would each sum to 100 if all sources were included. Many of the same
patterns of Table 4 appear here. The final columns, which portray tax
liability as a fraction of pre-tax expanded income, are worth noting.
Based on time-exposure income, the average tax burden continually
increases with income and ranges from 6.07 percent for the lowest in-
come class to 30.70 percent for the highest. In contrast, based on an
average of snapshots, the lowest income classes have a lower average
tax burden. The average tax liability of the highest class is also slightly
lower in snapshots compared to time-exposure income, 29.99 percent as
compared to 30.70 percent.
V. LONG-TERM TRENDS FROM A
TIME-EXPOSURE PERSPECTIVE
Section III of this paper showed that snapshots of annual tax return data
reveal a nearly continual increase in pre-tax income inequality between
1972 and 1988, with tax liability playing a small, or even negative, role in
offsetting that trend. Section IV argued that snapshots of the 1980s over-
state slightly the inequality of time-exposure income, a conceptually
more appealing measure of well-being.
In this section I attempt to draw the two strands of this research
together in order to answer the following type of question: Does compar-
ing snapshots of 1972 and 1988 misstate the true change in inequality
because of a change in the accuracy of a snapshot as a measure of time-
exposure income? In particular I investigate the intriguing hypothesis
that because of increased mobility, the increase in snapshot inequality
overstates the increase in time-exposure inequality.
To address these issues I make use of an earlier panel of tax returns
that spans the years 1967 to 1973. As for the 1979 to 1986 panel, the 1967
to 1973 data set was created by drawing all tax returns whose primaryTABLE 5.
Breakdown of Expanded Income, 1979-1985, into Sources of Income, by
Percen tile.
Source: 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
taxpayer had certain four-digit social security number endings. This pro-
cedure results in a random sample of taxpayers for any given year, but
the sample of taxpayers for which there is a tax return in each of the
seven years, the focus of our study, is not a random sample, and will













0-10 134.83 94.29 31.10 15.93 0.52 4.73
10-20 75.75 79.43 14.36 10.43 3.32 3.14
20-30 80.68 85.05 10.81 9.57 2.75 2.73
30-40 82.18 81.94 9.62 9.34 2.94 3.70
40-50 83.09 83.73 8.74 8.04 3.32 3.06
50-60 88.48 87.56 6.03 5.53 3.18 3.15
60-70 91.59 91.12 5.01 4.86 2.12 2.20
70-80 90.21 89.05 5.65 6.09 2.05 2.30
80-90 89.57 87.17 6.66 6.33 2.37 2.83
90-95 85.98 85.86 7.87 8.80 3.35 1.74
95-99 72.52 71.57 12.13 14.53 6.16 6.39
99-100 49.32 54.32 17.35 18.24 1.75 0.99
TOTAL 82.69 82.67 8.91 8.93 2.98 2.98
Percentile Capital Tax
Gains Liability
SA TE SA TE
0-10 8.81 4.68 4.61 6.07
10-20 0.71 1.11 5.50 7.41
20-30 0.55 1.08 7.97 9.15
30-40 0.70 0.97 9.59 10.14
40-50 1.07 1.14 10.83 11.21
50-60 0.79 1.03 12.07 12.44
60-70 0.61 1.88 12.84 13.09
70-80 1.21 1.84 13.86 13.79
80-90 1.58 2.01 15.59 15.66
90-95 2.56 3.30 17.64 17.78
95-99 6.59 6.80 21.71 21.48
99-100 24.56 22.64 29.99 30.70
Total 3.92 3.96 15.41 15.40122Slemrod
TABLE 6.
Percentage of Those in Top Percentiles of Expanded Income Who Were
Not in that Group in the Previous Year, 1968-1973.
Source: 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
bias is particularly troubling in this context, as taxpayers whose incomes
are more subject to downward mobility are more likely to be excluded
from the sample.
I look first directly at a simple indicator of income mobility. Table 6
reproduces Table 2 for the 1967 to 1973 period, showing the percentage
of those in the top 1, 5, and 10 percentiles that were not in that group in
the previous year. There are clear differences between the two periods,
especially for the top 1 percent and 5 percent groups. Over the 1968 to
1973 period, an average of 22.8 percent of those in the top 5 percent had
not been in that group the year before; for the 1980 to 1986 period that
figure rises to 26.9 percent (26.2 percent if 1986 is excluded). The differ-
ence is even larger for the top 1 percent of taxpayers. The average frac-
tion who had not been among the top 1 percent in the previous year was
22.7 percent between 1968 and 1973; it increased to 32.9 percent between
1980 and 1986 (31.7 percent excluding 1986).
Thus there is some evidence that income mobilityat least among the
highest income groupsincreased between 1967 and 1973 and 1979 and
1986. It is, therefore, conceivable that some of the increase in snapshot
inequality between these two periods does not correspond to an increase
in inequality of a more permanent notion of income.
The first two columns of Table 7 address this issue by comparing the
distribution of time-exposure income in the 1967 to 1973 panel to that of
time-exposure income in the 1979 to 1985 period. In the later period the
fraction of expanded income received by the poorest half of the popula-
tion declined significantly, from 25.69 percent to 23.90 percent. The
mirror image of this trend is an increase in the share of income earned by
the top half, with one notable exception. The share of expanded income
received by the top 1 percent declines from 10.42 percent to 7.64 percent
between the two periods. Thus, based on these figures in Table 7, the
characterization that "the poor got poorer and the rich got richer" must
be amended to add "except for the very rich." The amendment regard-
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
10% 20 24 23 20 19 21
5% 21 24 24 23 22 23
1% 20 20 24 25 24 23Taxation and Inequality123
TABLE 7.
Comparison of Inequality Measures for Before-Tax Time-Exposure
Income Using the 1967-1973 Panel and the 1979-1 985 Panel.
Source: 1967-1973 and 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
ing the very rich is reflected in the Gini summary measure of inequality,
which between these two periods increased from 0.373 to only 0.390, not
nearly as large an increase as one might expect based on the snapshots of
inequality discussed in Section III of this paper.
Compared to the results of Table 1, the numbers in Table 7 might seem
to suggest that much of the increase in inequality over the past two
decades is an artifact of comparing snapshots of distributions, and that
in particular the concentration of income in the highest income classes
has been overstated. This conclusion is not warranted.
The principal reason for the discrepancy is that the first three years of
the 1967 to 1973 period apparently predate the secular increase in in-
equality. In fact, the snapshot Gini coefficients from the balanced panel
for 1967 and 1968 are higher than those of nearly any other year in either
panel.7 Table 8 presents the Gini coefficients for each year of the two
panels (excluding 1986 for the later panel, so that each panel contains
7 The measured Gini coefficient for 1968 is particularly high due to the presence in the
sample of one return with a capital gain equal to more than 4 percent of the total income of
all taxpayers in that year's sample. The actual snapshot inequality in 1969, and possibly
1968, is due in part to the large amount of capital gains realizations in this year in anticipa-
tion of increased effective capital gains taxes, beginning in 1970. In this respect 1969 is like
1986. See Slemrod and Feldstein (1978).
Percentile
1967-1973 1979-1985 1970-1973 1982-1985
0-10 2.23 1.83 2.19 1.62
10-20 3.96 3.72 4.06 3.61
20-30 5.30 4.87 5.43 4.85
30-40 6.53 6.06 6.60 6.01
40-50 7.65 7.42 7.84 7.31
50-60 8.77 8.94 9.00 8.90
60-70 10.07 10.62 10.31 10.66
70-80 11.62 12.57 11.93 12.69
80-90 14.00 15.47 14.43 15.56
90-95 8.89 9.80 9.14 9.94
95-99 10.56 11.06 10.75 11.45
99-100 10.42 7.64 8.26 7.40
100 100 100 100
Before-Tax Gini .373 .390 .361 .397
After-Tax Cmi .347 .363 .335 .373124Slemrod
TABLE 8.
Gini Coefficients and Decomposition of Pre-Tax Time-Exposure
Expanded Income,1967-1973and1979-1985.
Source: 1967-1973 and 1979-1986 Panel of Individual Tax Returns, Balanced Panel Returns only.
seven years), as well as a Gini decomposition of time-exposure income
into its component years. The values of rho, which indicate the variabil-
ity of income over time, are not clearly different across the two periods.
A more formal comparison uses the measure of income mobility pro-
posed by Shorrocks (1978b), the ratio of (what I call) time-exposure
inequality to a weighted average of annual measures of inequality,
where the weights are the share of annual income in aggregate time-
exposure income. This comes to 0.9229 for 1967 to 1973 and 0.9260 for
1979 to 1985, indicating a slight decline in income mobility.
The final two columns of Table 6 confirm the importance of 1967 to
1969 for the conclusion that inequality did not increase much between
the two panel periods. These columns recalculate the distribution of
before-tax time-exposure expanded income, where time-exposure in-
come is calculated using only 1970 to 1973 for the earlier panel and only
1982 to 1985 for the later panel. The comparison of four-year time-
exposure incomes shows that there is a much less noticeable difference
in the concentration of incomes at the top. The increase in the Gini
coefficient of both pre-tax and after-tax income is about twice as large as
is evident when comparing the seven-year panels. The fact that the
increase in inequality between the two periods is less than one would
have guessed from Table 1 is primarily due to the difference in the
samples studied; Table 1 refers to the entire taxpaying population, while
Tables 6 and 7 refer only to those taxpayers who filed returns in each of
several years.













1967 .431 .126 .896 1979 .425 .135 .897
1968 .468 .148 .940 1980 .433 .142 .934
1969 .402 .141 .942 1981 .417 .142 .944
1970 .381 .140 .945 1982 .410 .139 .950
1971 .383 .142 .937 1983 .418 .141 .935
1972 .383 .149 .924 1984 .422 .148 .922
1973 .381 .153 .882 1985 .422 .154 .903Taxation and Inequality125
1973 and 1979 and 1985 in the degree to which snapshots overestimate
the inequality in time-exposure income. The small increase in the Gini
coefficient of time-exposure income predominantly reflects the fact that
the earlier period includes the high inequality years of 1967 through
1969.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
The principal conclusions from this study can be summarized as follows:
Based on annual tax return data, the inequality of pre-tax income has
been increasing steadily between 1972 and 1988. The major factor in
this trend has been the increasing inequality in the distribution of
wages and salaries.
Assuming exogenous pre-tax incomes, income taxation slightly de-
creases inequality. Overall it has neither stemmed nor contributed
significantly to the general trend. Since 1980 the contribution of the
income tax to decreasing inequality has declined slightly.
Replacing annual income with "time-exposure" income, defined as
average real income over the whole period, does not significantly
reduce the measured degree of inequality in the 1979 to 1985 period,
although the fraction of income received by the lowest decile does
increase substantially. This procedure does, though, reduce the con-
tribution to inequality of certain sources of income such as capital
gains and increase the contribution of other sources such as interest
and dividends.
There is only a slight increase between the 1967 to 1973 and 1979 to
1985 periods in the inequality of time-exposure income, a finding
apparently at odds with the measures of snapshot inequality. Much
of the discrepancy is, however, due to the inclusion in the former
period of the relatively high inequality years between 1967 and 1969.
There is no systematic evidence that the comparison of snapshots
between the two periods overstates the growth of inequality of a
more permanent notion of income.
Because all of these conclusions are based on an examination of tax
return data, several important caveats apply. The most important is that,
because households with income below a filing threshold need not file a
return, the distribution of taxpayers in any snapshot will omit a signifi-
cant fraction of the lower tail of the distribution of household income.
Moreover, because the real filing threshold is not constant over time, the
extent of taxpayers omitted from the snapshot changes. Thus, conclu-126Slemrod
sions 1 and 2 pertain to the universe of taxpayers, and not necessarily to
the universe of all households.
An additional caveat applies to conclusions 3 and 4, which are based
on distributions of snapshots and time exposures. These comparisons
are based on a subset of taxpayersthose who filed returns in each of a
number of consecutive years. Because this sampling criterion will tend to
exclude taxpayers whose income occasionally falls below the filing
threshold, it will likely understate the amount of snapshot income mobil-
ity. Furthermore, because the real filing thresholds change, the extent of
this effect may be different across the two panels studied here.
These caveats are meant to be taken seriously. They suggest that
further research should focus on the extent to which the trends in the
distributions of income and income sources among taxpayers reflect
accurately the trends in the distribution for all households, and on the
degree to which income mobility is misstated by ignoring taxpayers who
do not regularly file returns.
Policy decisions affecting the distribution of income cannot, alas,
await these desirable refinements to the techniques employed here.
Much analysis of alternative tax policies focuses solely on the taxpaying
population, without placing the results into the larger context of all
households. Thus it is valuable to know which kinds of conclusions
about taxation and inequality based on snapshots are likely to apply to a
more permanent notion of income. This paper is a first step in that
direction.
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